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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
pretation may ease this burden by limiting liability through consideration of
factors similar to those established in Lucas v. Hamm."
The impact of the decision remains to be seen. More than likely, insurance
premiums for attorney malpractice in the state will rise because of the permit-
ted expansion of liability. If the increase proves to be substantial, legal fees
may also increase to absorb the costs.
Bradford will be important for allowing recovery in tort by third party
beneficiaries. It also will allow third persons to rely upon an attorney's opinion
as long as the reliance can be reasonably foreseen by the attorney. It is this
step that may prove to be too burdensome and an overexpansion of attorney
negligence liability in Oklahoma.
Stephen M. Morris
Oil and Gas: Legislative Damage to Surface Rights
In 1859, E. L. Drake drilled the first producing oil well to a depth of 69
feet. Only fifteen years ago a well drilled to 12,000 feet was considered ex-
tremely deep. Today, however, production from strata underlying the surface
20,000 to 25,000 feet is not uncommon. This raises the question of whether
the law relating to the recovery of hydrocarbons should be expanded to match
the technological growth experienced by the recovery oriented industries.
Should judicial interpretation of recently enacted and preexisting legislation
continue to encourage exploration, development, and production of hydrocar-
bons, or rather would a modest dissuasion be appropriate? This question,
specifically limited to the substantive legal policies relating to an operator's
right to surface usage, will be addressed in this note.
Oklahoma has been an integral part of the most extensive drilling opera-
tions in recent times.I Because of the substantial increase in activity, the
Oklahoma legislature has deemed appropriate the enactment of special legisla-
tion in an attempt to redefine and expand the obligations of oil and gas
operators with regard to liability for surface damage.
Title 52, Sections 318.2 to 318.9 of the Oklahoma Statutes (Supp. 1982)
(hereafter referred to as the Surface Damage Act)' represents a radical and
87. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
1. Statewide drilling permits increased from 7,335 in 1979 to 17,014 in 1982. Telephone
interview with administrative staff member of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Oct. 13,
1982).
2. Act of June 2, 1982, ch. 341, 1982 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1062 (Vest). The Act was entitled:
An act relating to oil and gas; defining terms; providing procedures for payment
of surface damages in drilling for oil and gas; requiring bond or guaranteed letter
of credit; providing for appointment and procedures of appraisers; specifying pro-
cedure to determine damages; providing for appeal; limiting construction of act;
providing penalties; directing codification; providing severability; providing an
operative date; and declaring an emergency.
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unprecedented3 mutation in the law relating to oil and gas. The controversial
provisions of this Act constitute what is, in effect, a total repudiation of prior
common law principles concerning an operator's privilege to make use of the
surface incident to a drilling program. To ensure the payment of damages
for surface use, the Act requires every operator doing business in Oklahoma
to file a $25,000 corporate surety bond or letter of credit with the Secretary
of State. Extensive notice, negotiation, and potentially burdensome appraisal
procedures are also required.
It is contended here that legislative interference with such well-established
rights is unwarranted. Modem lease forms, with their comprehensively itemized
provisions,4 minimize a number of surface damage-related difficulties.
Moreover, most recurring problems emerge from the slow-moving judicial
animal enforcing those rights rather than from the substantive law itself.
The purpose of this note is to afford the practicing Oklahoma attorney
a readily ascertainable guide to assist in the comprehension of the newly enacted
statutes.5 There are five general categories: a historical perspective of surface
damage, a summarization of the Act, a clarification of its ambiguities, an
observation of the Act's practical realities, and a guide to successful operation.
6
Common Law
The payment of damages for injury to the surface during drilling opera-
tions is a unique concept within the law. 7 A surface owner's request for
remuneration is predicated not upon the wrongful conduct of the operator,
as in tort, but rather upon injuries that are a natural and expected result of
activities the operator has an absolute right to perform under a lease-drill
for oil and gas.
Every mineral lease, by implication, creates a dominant estate in the minerals
3. Detailed research of existing statutes from all oil- and gas-producing states confirmed
House Bill 1460 as being nationally unique. But cf. N.D. CErr. CODE §§ 38-11.1-01 to 38-11.1-10
(1980) (necessitating the payment of damages for diminution in land value and lost agricultural
production and income); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to 82-10-511 (1981) (paralleling the
North Dakota Act); S.D. COD. LAws ANN. §§ 45-5A-1 to 45-5A-11 (1982) (also paralleling the
North Dakota Act).
4. For example, the American Ass'n of Petroleum Landmen (AAPL) Form 670 provides:
For the purpose of carrying on'geological, geophysical and other exploratory work
including core drilling, the right to enter upon said lands for such purposes without
any additional payments, and for the purpose of drilling, mining and operating
for, producing, and saving all of the oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline
and all other gases and their respective constituent vapors, and constructing roads,
laying pipe lines, building tanks, storing oil, building power stations, telephone
lines and other structures thereon necessary or convenient for the economical opera-
tion of said land, to produce, save, take care of, and manufacture all of such
substances, and also for housing and boarding employees. . ..
5. 52 OaLA. STAT. §§ 318.2-318.9 (Supp. 1982).
6. Because of its scope, the constitutionality of the Surface Damage Act will not be dis-
cussed. See also Note, Oil and Gas: Surface Damages, Operators and the Oil and Gas Attorney,
36 OKLA. L. REv. 414 (1983).
7. 4 E. Kutz, OIL AND GAS § 49.4 (1972).
1983]
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and consequently a servient estate in the surface.' In addition, all oil- and
gas-producing states have uniformly held, "every oil and gas lease carries with
it the right to possession of the surface to the extent reasonably necessary
to enable the lessee to perform the obligations imposed upon him by the
lease."9 Though this statement appears to be relatively clear, it is difficult
to apply. Specifically, what is a reasonable amount of the surface? Is one
to infer this applies to what the surface owner considers reasonable or that
which the operator deems reasonable? Perhaps this is a veiled attempt to
employ the use of Professor William Prosser's "reasonable man" standard.10
"Surface damage"" has long escaped universal definition2 or application."
Not only does the phrase connote various consequences from state to state,'4
it also differs as between parties to every leasing transaction.S Surface owners
will always tend to use a more restrictive interpretation of reasonable surface
use, while lessees and operators will construe it as generally as possible. Sur-
face owners will construe it narrowly in order to be compensated for any
damage beyond the limited scope of their definition. Consequently, however,
operators will do just the opposite. They will encourage a definition so broad
that any damage, however remote, will come within the boundaries of their
interpretation. Fortunately, through years of litigation on this precise issue,
the-courts have given us a fairly determinative view of what comes within
the ambit of surface damage."'
8. See Sellers, How Dominant is the Dominant Estate? Or, Surface Damages Revisited,
13H On. & GAS INST. 377 (1962).
9. Emphasis added. Accord, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Deese, 275 Ala. 178, 183, 153 So. 2d 614,
619 (1963); Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 254 Cal. App. 2d 4,
62 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1967); Phoenix v. Graham, 349 I1l. App. 326, 330, 110 N.E.2d 669,
672 (1953); Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Ky. 1974); Hawthorne
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 368 So. 2d 726, 737 (La. 1979); Central Oil Co. v.
Shows, 246 Miss. 300, 308, 149 So. 2d 306, 310 (1963); Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d
131, 135 (N.D. 1979); Hinds v. Phillips Pet. Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1979); Pulaski Oil
Co. v. Conner, 62 Okla. 211, 214, 162 P. 464, 466 (1916); Ottis v. Haas, 569 S.W.2d 508, 513
(Tex. 1978).
10. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32 (1971).
11. This is often referred to within the industry as "location damage."
12. Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 94 W. Va. 81, 102-03, 118 S.E. 162, 171 (1923).
13. Caldwell-Guadalupe Pick-up Stations v. Gregg, 276 S.W. 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
(reasonable surface use doctrine entitled lessee, to the exclusion of the lessor, to construct pick-
up stations for the retention of escaping waste oil from his own wells); Gregg v. Caldwell-Guadalupe
Pick-up Stations, 286 S.W. 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (reversed and remanded previous case);
Humphreys Oil Co. v. Liles, 277 S.W. 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (lessor may use or grant land
to maintain pick-up stations, conditioned, however, that such use does not prevent the lessee
from retaining the waste oil from his own wells or interfere with operations).
14. Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1959) (applying reasonable surface use
doctrine to oil and gas production); Stamp v. Windsor Power House Coal Co., 154 W. Va.
578, 177-S.E. 146 (1970) (applying reasonable surface use doctrine to coal production).
15. Crop damage would be an obvious example. Unless crops were contiguous to the drilling
operations where damage would be foreseen, the surface owner will most certainly object and
request relief. However, absent leasing provisions specifically addressing crop damage, the operator
will not be liable.
16. For a more extensive review of the law relating to surface damages, see Davis, Selected
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Inherent in the rights of a dominant estate, lessees have an absolute right
of ingress and egress"' and consequently the right to build and maintain roads
to and from each drill site, the right to construct slush pits, tanks, drainage
ditches, salt-water ponds,' and housing for employees, ' 9 and are further en-
titled to remove their property, including casing, within a reasonable time
after the expiration of the lease.20 Therefore, notwithstanding negligent or
wanton conduct2' or special leasing provisions,2 2 a lessee is not liable for
damage to growing crops23 or other injuries24 necessarily incident to the drill-
ing anfd continued operation of an oil or gas well. Because lessees generally
subcontract actual drilling operations, this immunity from liability extends
to all independent contractors and agents." Furthermore, an assignment or
sale of any part of the surface owner's interest will not serve to extinguish
this right. The assignee or subsequent purchaser merely takes the interest sub-
ject to the previously acquired right of the lessee.
26
In Oklahoma, an operator has no affirmative duty to restore the premises
to their original condition upon cessation of drilling." Although the'mineral
owner possesses the dominant estate, he may not blindly or willingly ignore
the correlative rights of the surface owner,28 nor may the surface owner in-
terfere with the activities of the operator in carrying out his duties pursuant
to the lease.9 Even though the rights and liabilities of both estates are fairly
Problems Regarding Lessee's Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 8 ROCKY MTN. Mn'.
L. INST. 315 (1963); Lambert, Surface Rights of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKLA. L. REV.
373 (1958); Sellers, supra note 8.
17. Davon Drilling Co. v. Ginder, 467 P.2d 470, 472 (Okla. 1970).
18. See Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Dunivant, 183 Okla. 233, 233, 80 P.2d 225,
226 (1938).
19. Mid-Continent Pet. Corp. v. Donelson, 189 Okla. 273, 274, 116 P.2d 721, 723 (1941).
20. Luttrell v. Parker Drilling Co., 341 P.2d 244, 246 (Okla. 1959).
21. Id.
22. In Phillips Pet. Co. v. Sheel, 206 Okla. 330, 331, 243 P.2d 726 (1952), the subject lease
provided-
During operations the lessee shall pay all damages for the use of the surface, other
than that included in the location and tanksites, all damages to any growing crops
or any improvements on the lands and all other damages as may be occasioned
by reason of operations. Such damages shall be apportioned among the parties
interested in the surface, whether as owner, lessee, or otherwise, as the parties may
mutually agree or as their interest may appear. If the parties are unable to agree
concerning damages, the same shall be determined by arbitration, bui nothing herein
contained shall be construed to deny the surface owner or lessee the right to appeal
to the courts without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, in the event
he is dissatisfied with the amount of damages awarded him.
23. Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591, 594 (Okla. 1959).
24. But cf. Phillips Pet. Co. v. Sheel, 206 Okla. 330, 331, 243 P.2d 726, 728-29 (1952) (in-
jury sustained by livestock considered not necessarily incident to operations).
25. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391, 1398 (Okla. 1973).
26. Lone Star Producing Co. v. Jury, 445 P.2d 284, 287 (Okla. 1968).
27. Fox v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 201 Okla. 17, 21, 200 P.2d 398, 401 (1948).
28. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391, 1396-97 (Okla. 1973).
29. Accord, Luttrell v. Parker Drilling Co., 341 P.2d 244, 246 (Okla. 1959).
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well defined, in unsettled areas the almost insurmountable burden of proving
what is unreasonable rests squarely upon the shoulders of the surface owner.3 0
Oklahoma's Surface Damage Act
As of July 1, 1982, all Oklahoma common law principles of surface damage
liability have undergone a de facto repeal by the Surface Damage Act.3 In
effect, the Act transposes the traditionally superior interest of the lessee/oper-
ator3 2 with that of the subordinate surface owners, expanding the rights of
the latter while restricting those of the former.3 To aid thorough understand-
ing, the statutes are summarized below. They are comprised of six major pro-
visions: Bonding, notice, negotiations, appraisals, exceptions-jury trials, and
damages.
Bonding
Every operator doing business in Oklahoma is required to file a corporate
surety bond or letter of credit from a banking institution with the Secretary
of State in the sum of $25,000. 34 The bonding company or bank must file
a certificate regarding the status35 of the letter or bond with the court clerk
in each county where the operator is or will be drilling.36 The bond or letter
of credit must remain in full force during all drilling operations. Upon deposit
of the bond or letter of credit 37 the operator may enter and commence
drilling.
38
30. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (Okla. 1958).
31. Conversations with State Representative Vernon Dunn (D., House Dist. 51, Loco, Okla.)
and State Senator Paul Taliaferro (D., Senate Dist. 31, Lawton, Okla.), the Act's principal authors,
revealed the primary impetus for the legislation to be a general lack of respect on the part of
operators with regard to the agricultural and ranching interests of their surface owners. Incident
to his coauthorship, Representative Dunn stated he had personally experienced "difficulty" with
operators moving equipment onto a drill site prior to notifying him of such intentions. Addi-
tionally, his constituents had informed him of operators claiming up to thirty-five acres as necessary
for carrying out their operations.
When questioned concerning coercion from special interest groups, Senator Taliaferro com-
mented that there had been no direct pressure from any one group, rather, that he had been
morally supported by various organizations including but not limited to the Cattleman's Association,
the Farm Bureau, and the Farmers' Union.
32. Throughout the remainder of this note, the terms "lessee" and "operator" will be used
interchangeably.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 7-30.
34. The Act, as originally drafted, provided for a $25,000 bond to be posted in each and
every county within which an operator intended to drill. Alternatively, to avoid the tremendous
expense incurred while operating in several counties, a statewide bond in the sum of $200,000
could be posted that would exempt the depositor from the necessity of filing any additional bonds.
35. In full force and amount, pending litigation, insufficient or canceled.
36. No filing fee is required.
37. See generally the discussion infra regarding deposit in text accompanying notes 65-68.
38. See generally the discussion infra regarding entry in text accompanying notes 59-64.
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Notice
Before entering the drill site,39 an operator is required to give written notice,
via certified mail, to all ascertainable surface owners of his intent to drill.
The notice must specify the proposed location and approximate date of
spudding.
In instances where there are non-state-resident surface tenants, non-state-
resident surface owners, unknown heirs, imperfect titles, surface owners, or
surface tenants whose whereabouts cannot be ascertained with reasonable
diligence40 (hereafter referred to as "unascertainables"), notice may be given
by publication in the respective county newspaper qualified to publish legal
notices pursuant to Title 25, Section 106 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1981)."
Negotiations
Within five days of service of notice, the operator and the surface owner
must enter into negotiations to determine prospective surface damages. Upon
agreement as to the amount of damage and after a written contract has been
signed, the operator will be allowed entry.42 If the agreed upon damages are
in excess of the posted bond, the operator must pay the damages immediately
or post an additional bond.43
Appraisers
If the operator and surface owner cannot agree to a reasonable amount
of damages or if all surface owners cannot be contacted,4' the operator must
petition the district court to appoint appraisers to make recommendations to
the parties and the court concerning proper damages.' Ten days' notice of
the petition must be given to the opposite party." Notice may be accomplished
by personal service or by leaving a copy at the residence of the surface owner
with any member of his family over fifteen years of age. In the case of unascer-
tainables, notice may be published in the proper newspaper.'
39. Id.
40. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Bomford v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968).
41. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 106 (1981), requires a "newspaper" to be published for a period of
104 consecutive weeks immediately prior to the publication of any legal notice, advertisement,
or publication of any kind required or provided by any of the laws of the state of Oklahoma
if such notice or advertisement is to be considered valid in a legal newspaper.
42. See generally the discussion infra regarding entry in text accompanying notes 59-64.
43. See generally the discussion infra regarding excess damages in text accompanying notes
69-70.
44. Presumably, surface owners does not include those who have been deemed "unascer-
tainable." See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
45. Petitions to appoint appraisers are to be filed with the district court clerk of the county
within which drilling is to occur. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5(A) (Supp. 1982).
46. See generally the discussion infra regarding notice in text accompanying notes 70-72.
47. See supra note 44.
19831
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Both the operator and the surface owner will be allowed to select one ap-
praiser each. The third appraiser will be chosen by the two previously ap-
pointed appraisers. If an agreement cannot be reached concerning any one
of the appraisers, the district court will select that appraiser. Prior to entering
upon their duties, the court must administer an oath of impartiality to the
appraisers. After petitioning for appraisers, the operator may enter the site
to drill. 8 After an inspection of the property and within fifteen days of their
appointment,4 the appraisers are required to file a written report with the
clerk of the district court. This report will specify quantity, boundaries, and
value of the drill-site property. The appraisers will determine and report to
the district court the amount and manner0 of payment for damages.
Within ten days after receipt of the appraisers' report, the district court
will forward to each attorney, each party, and any other interested party of
record a copy of the report. The district court will determine the salaries of
the appraisers and court costs, which will be divided equally between both
parties."s
Exceptions-Jury Trial
With the copy of the appraisers' report will be a notice of time restrictions
concerning the filing of an exception or a demand for a jury trial.
In an attempt to reach the unascertainables, the district court will forward
a copy of the appraisers' report, combined with the notice of time restraints,
to the last-known mailing address of each party and shall have published a
copy of the notice in the proper county newspaper.5 2 All exceptions must be
made within thirty days of the filing of the appraisers' report. The time for
filing an exception to the report or a demand for a jury trial will be calculated
as commencing from the date the appraisers' report is filed. If the court clerk
fails to give proper notice, a time extension may be requested by any interested
party. An extension will not be less than twenty days from the date the ap-
plication is heard by the court.
The district court has the power to confirm, reject, modify, or order a new
appraisal. If a new appraisal is ordered, the operator has the right to enter
the property subject to a continuance of a valid bond." Appraisers' fees and
court costs may be the subject of an exception. All demands for a jury trial
must be made within sixty days of the filing of the appraisers' report. If the
48. See generally the discussion infra regarding entry in text accompanying notes 59-64.
49. Because the district court is under no time restraint concerning selection of a third ap-
praiser, the effective date of appointment will be the time at which the final appraiser is chosen.
50. The legislatively appointed capacity of the appraisers to determing the manner of pay-
ment exceeds the scope and purpose of their duties and appears to bestow them with quasi-
judicial powers.
51. Potential for abuse exists here. Why the Act does not allow for predetermined fees and
expenses remains a point of bewilderment.
52. See supra note ,14.
53. See generally the discussion infra regarding entry in text accompanying notes 59-64.
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party demanding a jury does not recover a more favorable verdict, he will
be assessed all court costs, including a reasonable attorney fee.1
4
Any aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the district court or the
jury." However, such an appeal will not be allowed to postpone or delay
any work on the property, provided the award of the appraiser has been
deposited.
Damages
The operator may be liable for treble damages if the surface owner can
show by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that:
(1) The operator willfully and knowingly entered the land for the purpose
of drilling before giving proper notice or without the agreement of the sur-
face owner;56
(2) The operator willfully and knowingly failed to keep the bond or letter
of credit posted; and
(3) The operator failed to agree upon damages and did not petition the
district court to appoint appraisers."
Recovery pursuant to this Act does not preclude collecting additional future
damages.5 8
Scope and Effect
The Surface Damage Act is ambiguous. Because it has only been in effect
since July of 1982, the courts have not had the opportunity to review and
pronounce policies concerning its construction.
Of primary importance to both the operator and surface owner is the issue
of exactly when an operator may enter a leasehold to commence drilling opera-
54. Representative Dunn distinguished this provision as an effort to discourage subterfuge
and dilatory tactics.
55. This provision most likely will extend to working interest owners, but will not include
royalty owners because of their nonparticipation in expenses.
56. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 1982) provides in part:
Upon presentation of clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the operator willfully
and knowingly entered upon the premises for the purpose of commencing the drill-
ing of a well before giving notice of such entry or without the agreement of the
surface owner, the court may, in a separate action, award treble damages. The
issue of non-compliance shall be a fact question, determinable without a jury....
This section is in conflict with state constitutional and statutory provisions for trial by jury.
Article II, section 18 of the Oklahoma constitution states: "The right of trial by jury shall be,
and remain inviolate, except in civil cases wherein the amount in controversy does not exceed
One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), ... "
12 OKLA. STAT. § 556 (1981) provides that "issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery
of money, . . . shall be tried by a jury. .. ."
57. See generally the discussion infra regarding treble damages in text accompanying notes 73-77.
58. Presumably, this refers to damage that penetrates boundaries set by appraisers and does
not reflect an intention to require further payment for actual damages which are in excess of
estimates.
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tions. The Act confusingly permits entry at five distinct times":
1. Entry is permitted subsequent to notice of intent to drill being served;"
2. Entry is permitted upon the deposit or letter of credit;"
3. Entry is permitted after filing petition for appointment of appraisers;
2
4. Entry is permitted subsequent to the execution of a written contract con-
cerning the amount of damages;3 and
5. Entry is permitted upon the district court's determination that the ap-
praisal is both valid and appropriate and that a new appraisal is not
warranted.
6"
Obviously, these provisions were not intended to be mutually exclusive but
rather to be considered as comprehensive requirements, each addressing dif-
ferent fact situations. When appraisers are not required, entries 1, 2, and 4
should be applied cumulatively. Therefore, before entering, an operator should
serve the surface owner with proper notice of an intent to drill, confirm the
filing of a certificate regarding the status of the bond or letter of credit with
the district court clerk, and execute a written contract referencing the agreed-
upon damages.
When arbitration is required, the inference may be made that entry 5
disallows entry until the district court has had an opportunity to scrutinize
the appraisers' report. However, because of the more specific wording of entry
3, the better view is to allow entry subsequent to the operator's petition to
appoint appraisers.
Regarding entry, section 318.4(C) provides in part, "[u]pon deposit of the
bond or letter of credit, the operator then shall be permitted entry. ... 1
However, the Act necessitates two separate "deposits": the operator's filing
of a $25,000 corporate surety bond or letter of credit with the Secretary of
State" and the bonding company's or the banking institution's duty to file
a certificate regarding the present status of that bond or letter of credit in
the office of the district court clerk of the county where drilling is to take
place.67 Neither requirement alludes to a deposit; therefore, to which "fil-
ing" does this section refer?
The specific reference to "deposit of bond or letter of credit" made in sec-
tion 318.4(C)," without mention of the certificate, indicates that an operator
is entitled to enter after depositing the specified sum with the Secretary of
State. Upon more thorough review, however, this interpretation appears
59. Although not specifically defined within the text of the statutes, entry presumably refers
to the movement of heavy or surface-damaging types of equipment onto a leasehold, and does
not include entering for inspection purposes.
60. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.3 (Supp. 1982).
61. Id. § 318.4(C).
62. Id. § 318.5(A).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 318.5(F).
65. Id. § 318.4(C).
66. Id. § 318.4(A).
67. Id. § 318.4(B).
68. Id. § 318.4(C).
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unreasonable. If the Act were to be construed as permitting entry subsequent
to filing with the Secretary of State only, then what, if anything, would be
the purpose of ever filing a certificate with the district court? It would not
ensure a surface owner's damage recoupment and would be of no practical
significance.
Therefore, the better view would be to consider both filings joint re-
quirements. This would effectuate the Act's purpose more completely in that
surface owners would be assured of compensation prior to the operator's entry.
In contemplation of agreed-upon damages that exceed the $25,000 bond
or letter of credit, the Surface Damage Act requires the "operator . . . pay
the damages immediately or post an additional bond or letter of credit suffi-
cient to cover the damages."69 Posting an additional bond is of no great
significance; however, the Act is not clear whether the total amount of damage
must be paid upon reaching an agreement or whether the excess of the original
bond must be recompensed.
To construe this provision as requiring an operator to pay damages in full
whenever they exceed $25,000 appears to establish an arbitrary one-cent distinc-
tion and reduce available working capital. Suppose the appraisal of prospec-
tive damage to Tract A is $25,000. Then suppose the damage appraisal of
Tract B is $25,000.01. Should the operator on Tract B have to pay the entire
amount of the appraisal while the operator on Tract A is obligated to do
nothing? Such 'an inequitable result is not in keeping with the purpose of the
Act. Though all too familiar with the colloquialism "you gotta draw the line
somewhere," such wisdom should not be employed where unnecessary. Here,
it is unnecessary. The best view is to interpret this provision as compelling
only the immediate payment of those surface damages that are in excess of
$25,000.
If entry is not permitted because negotiations have failed, the operator70
who petitions the district court to appoint appraisers is required to give ten
days' notice "of the petition" to the opposite party." Unfortunately, this
provision can be construed in two ways. Specifically, does the notice require-
ment place an affirmative duty upon the operator to serve the surface owner
with notice of the intention to petition ten days before an appearance,7" or
is a ten-day period to follow filing the petition so that the surface owner may
appoint one appraiser? Because no practical purpose would be served by re-
quiring the operator to notify the surface owner ten days prior to petitioning,
common sense would dictate that the surface owner has a ten-day period after
notice has been served to appoint an appraiser.
Epitomizing the poor draftsmanship of the Surface Damage Act is section
69. Id. § 318.4(D).
70. Section 318.5(A) explicitly states: "the operator shall petition the district court." Id. §
318.5(A).
71. Id. § 318.5(B).
72. Simply filing a petition for the appointment of appraisers with the court clerk has not
been allowed by the Oklahoma courts. Rather, the operator or his representative must appear
before the district court for a hearing concerning the appointment and to choose their appraiser.
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318.9"1: Violation of Act-Damages. That section provides in part: "Any
operator who willfully and knowingly . . . fails to come to an agreement
and does not ask the court for appraisers, shall pay . . . treble damages to
the surface owner." This provision raises the question of whether an operator's
liability for treble damages is predicated upon failure to petition for the ap-
pointment of appraisers after negotiations with the surface owner have failed.
Surely this Act was not intended to limit an operator's right to abandon
intentions of drilling if so desired. Even the most fertile legal imagination
could not possibly justify a requirement that would compel operators to drill
when they do not want to. Inevitably, situations will arise when, subsequent
to beginning negotiations, economic necessities will force an operator to
reevaluate and change a drilling program. Should such an occurrence expose
one to treble liability? Certainly not. Moreover, because no actual harm has
been done, it is difficult if not impossible to rationalize why a surface owner
should be entitled to double recovery-treble damages now and compensa-
tion for surface damage by another operator later. Public policy demands
that this proviso not be interpreted as to allow such an event. Most likely,
the authors of the Surface Damage Act intended this passage to apply to situa-
tions where an operator entered after negotiations had failed but before re-
questing appraisers. In any event, the treble damage provisions of this Act
must be used as a shield, not a sword.
Because of the severity of treble damages, the Act requires the surface owner
to present "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" of an operator's disregard
for its provisions.7" This is a more exacting burden of persuasion"5 than the
usual civil standard of "preponderance" and is used only in specific types
of cases.76 Courts and juries should take notice of this higher burden and
not grant treble damages for mere clerical oversight or other inadvertent
mistakes.7
Of less importance, because of its speculative basis, is whether the words
"if any" contained in section 318.5(A)"I of the Act are an obscure reference
to the common law doctrine of "reasonable surface use."' 9 Arguably, the
inclusion of these two words signifies the authors' intent to leave the
"reasonable surface use" principle intact. Theoretically, a reasonable use of
73. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 1982).
74. Id.
75. C. McCORMCK, EVIDENCE § 340 (1972).
76. Fraud, undue influence, specific performance of oral contracts, oral contracts to make
a will, etc.
77. Prior to this enactment, treble damages were not awarded. However, the meting out of
exemplary damages for cases of willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the operator or
lessee was authorized. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Brown, 477 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1970).
78. Section 318.5(A) provides in part:
If agreement is not reached, or if the operator is not able to contact all parties,
the operator shall petition the district court in the county in which the drilling site
is located for appointment of appraisers to make recommendations to the parties
and to the court concerning the amount of damages, if any.
52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.5(A) (Supp. 1982).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 7-30.
[Vol. 36
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
NOTES
the surface may still be implied in every lease, thus limiting the Act's ap-
plicability to damage occurring above and beyond the scope of reasonable
operations.
Practically speaking, reliance on this interpretation could be quite hazar-
dous. Although an encouraging thought, it appears that this clause is merely
an erroneous reference to the overriding contractual ability of specifically
itemized leasing agreements.8 ° Its application should be restricted to situa-
tions where leases are absent surface damage provisions. If provided in a lease,
a surface damage clause should take precedence over the negotiation and/or
appraisal requirements, regardless of whether the Act ostensibly confers such
rights upon the owner of a severed surface estate.8"
When did the surface damage statutes become effective? Section 11 of the
original Bill 8 provided for an effective date of July 1, 1982, but section 12
declared an emergency to exist, thus rendering the Act in "full force from
and after its passage and approval." Governor George Nigh approved and
signed the Act June 2, 1982.
The case of Cities Service Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission" appears
to be controlling. In that case, Cities Service sought to recover monies paid
as mileage tax pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Mileage Act of 1937. The con-
troversy involved the date upon which a repealing section of the Motor Vehi-
cle License and Registration Act of 1939 was to take effect. The latter act
repealed the former. The 1939 Act" contained inconsistent provisions for an
operative date. An emergency clause would have the Act take effect April
18, 1939, while the operational clause provided for an effective date of January
1, 1940. If the emergency clause controlled, Cities Service would be entitled
to a refund. Conversely, if the provision for an operative date took precedence,
then no reimbursement was in order.
In deciding the case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "by adding the
emergency, the Act becomes a law on approval in this state, but, by express
provision, it may be held in abeyance until a specified time." 5 This holding
indicates that the Surface Damage Act became a law on June 2, 1982, with
its implementation postponed until July 1, 1982.
Probably the most pressing question involving the Act has yet to be dis-
cussed. Is it to affect only those leaseholds acquired subsequent to July 1,
1982,86 or will it apply to all lands which have yet to be entered and damaged
regardless of their leasing dates?8 7
80. See supra notes 4, 22 and text accompanying note 25.
81. "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair existing contractual rights nor
shall it prohibit parties from contracting to establish correlative rights on the subject matter
contained in this act." 52 OKLA. STAT. § 381.7 (Supp. 1982).
82. Okla. H.B. 1460 (1982).
83. 191 Okla. 303, 129 P.2d 597 (1942).
84. Motor Vehicle License and Registration Act (1939), codified at 47 OKLA. STAT. § 22-40.6
(1981).
85. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 191 Okla. 303, 304, 129 P.2d 597, 599
(1942).
86. Okla. H.B. 1460, § 11 (1982).
87. Representative Dunn stated he was of the opinion the Surface Damage Ac should apply
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Generally, statutes are to be construed as having prospective operations
unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospec-
tive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used.8 Furthermore, "in every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved
against the retrospective effect."8 9 However, if the provisions of a statute
affect merely procedural processes, the statute evades the presumption favor-
ing prospective operation and is said to apply retrospectively."0
In the recent case of Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp.,' the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decided whether the state's statutory Pugh clause9" was to be applicable
to leasehold interests acquired prior to the operative date of the statute. In
that case, the court held it unnecessary for a statute to state expressly an
intention to operate retrospectively if such an intent can be inferred by review-
ing its purpose and method of enactment." However, the court held a statute,
absent express legislative intent, will not be applied retroactively if it alters
the rights and duties under an existing contract or if the result would be to
impair an obligation of a contract.94 That decision parallels the Oklahoma
constitutional provision that, "no . . . law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts . . . shall ever be passed."951
The Act itself provides, "nothing herein shall be construed to impair ex-
isting contractual rights nor shall it prohibit parties from contracting to
establish correlative rights on the subject matter contained in this act."' 96 A
retrospective application would destroy implied contractual rights regarding
reasonable surface use,9 7 thus negating any contention favoring such an ap-
plication irrationally based upon the premise that its effect is merely
procedural.98 Such an impairment of rights would be of questionable validity
under the Oklahoma and federal constitutions. Moreover, a close examina-
tion of the terminology contained within the Act reveals no wording either
so clearly expressed or so imperative that a retrospective application is man-
dated or that it was written to reflect any implications ,that deem such opera-
tion necessary. Doubt does exist and, as previously stated, all doubts must
be resolved against retroactive operation. The Act should be applied prospec-
tively, affecting only those leaseholds acquired on or after July 1, 1982.
Assuming, arguendo, the Act operates retrospectively, the question arises
to all leaseholds which have yet to be damaged. Senator Taliaferro revealed that when drafting
the Act, he had no intentions of it operating retrospectively.
88. Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okla. 1973).
89. Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 441 P.2d 967, 969 (Okla. 1968).
90. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd. v. Central Okla. Master Conservancy Dist., 464 P.2d
748, 756 (Okla. 1969).
91. 623 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1981).
92. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(b) (1981).
93. Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 623 P.2d 613, 616 (Okla. 1981).
94. Id.
95. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 15.
96. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.7 (Supp. 1982).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 7-30.
98. MFA Ins. Co. v. Hankins, 610 P.2d 785, 787-88 (Okla. 1980).
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whether coverage pertains to the actual date of entry or simply the effective
date of the Act. The use of hypothetical situations will illustrate the four possi-
ble situations. All examples presume no agreement for surface damage exists
between the surface owner and the operator.
1. X executes a lease in favor of Y on March 28, 1982. Y completes opera-
tions on June 1, 1982.
Obviously, Y cannot be held liable for damages pursuant to the Act because
both the leasing transaction and the damage occurred prior to the operative
date of the Act.
2. X executes a lease in favor of Y on March 28, 1982. Y commences drill-
ing on June 1, 1982, but does not complete operations by July 1, 1982.
This situation presents a much more difficult problem. Using common sense,
one deduces it would be impossible to adhere to the notice and negotiation
provisions of the Act. However, ample opportunity exists for a damage ap-
praisal and the filing of a bond or letter of credit.
The Act requires every operator doing business within the state to file a
bond or letter of credit and imposes liability for treble damages for those
who do not.9 9 Therefore, the prudent thing to do, irrespective of when entry
is made, is to promptly file the bond or letter of credit with the Secretary
of State.
It is more difficult to determine whether an appraisal is required. The Sur-
face Damage Act expressly provides for appraisal subsequent o entry,'0 con-
ditioned, however, on a maximum time limitation of fifteen days. Should
the hypothetical situation be distinguished from the post-entry appraisal
allowance, or should appraisals be required in all instances where drilling
overlaps the Act's operative date?' Because the intent of this Act is to ascer-
tain the amount of damage prior to or within a limited time after it occurs,
requiring appraisals on drill sites where activity is substantially underway would
be inconsistent with its purpose.
The best view of this situation would be to compel adherence to appraisal
provisions only when entry has been made subsequent to July 1, 1982. This
view enunciates the principle that the date of entry should be the controlling
factor of the Act's retrospective applicability.
3. X executes a lease in favor of Y on March 28, 1982. Y commences drill-
ing on August 1, 1982.
Applying the principle stated above, an operator entering after the operative
date of the Act will be subject to all its provisions. This is so because the
opportunity to effectuate its express purpose exists.
4. X executes a lease in favor of Y on August 1, 1982. Y commences opera-
tions thereafter.
Because both the leasing date and damage occurred subsequent to the
operative date of the Act, an operator must conform to all its provisions.
99. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 318.9 (Supp. 1982).
100. Entry permitted after petitioning for the appointment of appraisers.
101. The effective date of the Act was July 1, 1982.
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In instances where the lessor and surface owner are one and the same, a
situation arises where as partial consideration for the lease, the lessee increased
the royalty or bonus in lieu of providing for the payment of surface damages.
If such an occurrence can be proved by comparing bonuses and royalties paid
for nearby leases, an operator should be exempt from the requirements of
the Act other than posting a bond or letter of credit.
The most immediate result of this legislation has been to strain the already
tenuous surface owner-operator relationship. In the past, the best interest of
operators has been served by sustaining amicable relationships with surface
owners. Operators with poor surface owner relations have occasionally found
themselves obstructed from getting to a drill site or carrying on operations
upon arrival by an angry landowner.'0 2 What was best for the surface owner
was also best for the operator. This resulted in a mutually agreeable
compensation.
Now, however, the table has turned. The Surface Damage Act effectively
places operators and surface owners in adversary positions. Although it re-
quires "good faith negotiations,"'° an operator who does not care to waste
time may simply claim that good faith negotiations had occurred, petition
for the appointment of appraisers, and move in. Certainly this will frustrate
surface owners. Additionally, as a result of being permitted entry after peti-
tioning, operators should be indifferent as to whether the case is ever heard-
they already have what they want, again incensing surface owners. Develop-
ing this "bad blood" between the two parties cannot be healthy for either.
Somewhat drastic retaliation should not be an unexpected result. Surely,
situating operators and surface owners in such combative positions was not
the intention of this Act. However, it is the result. In the best interest of
all concerned, serious consideration should be given to its repeal.
In a final effort to help clarify these statutes,' a proposed guideline to
be followed prior to entering any leasehold will be offered.
1. If negotiating the original lease:
A. By all means, endeavor to specifically itemize any matter which
could be subsequently construed as surface damage, and;
2. If operating pursuant to preexisting lease:
A. Deposit the required bond or letter of credit with the Secretary
of State;
B. Confirm the filing of a certificate regarding the present status of
your bond or letter of credit with the court clerk in the county of the pro-
posed well;
C. Give proper notice to all surface owners;
D. Within five days of service of notice, negotiate surface damages
with the surface owner(s);
102. Surface owners armed with shotguns greeting drilling rigs at the front gate is not an.
uncommon tale.
103. 52 OK.A. STAT. § 318.3 (Supp. 1982).
104. Id. § 318.2-.9.
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